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Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New
Terrain in New Jersey
Ronald F. Wright*
I.

Introduction

The current legal map of criminal justice in the United States offers
little detail about the prosecutor's territory.
This is not because
prosecutors do not deserve the attention. The American prosecutor is the
single most powerful figure on the landscape of the criminal courts.
Nevertheless, the relevant legal boundaries on prosecutors are few, and
many of us find it difficult to get beyond the observation that the
prosecutor holds great discretion. For legal cartographers, the land of
prosecutorial discretion is terra incognita.
The territory remains unknown because it presents so few of the
familiar legal landmarks like judicial opinions or legislation. American
criminal codes are written to give prosecutors wide selection among
possible crimes when charging a case. Legislators only rarely attempt to
regulate that discretion; over time they delegate to prosecutors more and
more choices about the practical reach of the criminal law. Courts also
hold back, routinely declaring that the prosecutor's selection among
charges, or indeed the decision to decline charges altogether, is none of
their business.1 No judicial review of the selection of charges is
available except in the rare and difficult-to-prove case where a
prosecutor intentionally discriminates on the basis of race or sex or some
2
other constitutionally-protected category.
Given the lack of legislative standards to control prosecutorial
decisions, and the disinterest of the courts, legal scholarship has said
relatively little about discretionary prosecutor choices (beyond lamenting
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. My thanks go to all the participants
in the Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum at the University of Louisville in November
2004. I also received helpful advice from Wayne Logan and Marc Miller.
1. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); United States v. Cox, 342
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
2. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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the fact that they are discretionary). This is true even though the
prosecutor's power is central to understanding criminal justice in this
country. Where there is "no law to apply,",3 there is no particular value
for legal scholars to add.
But what if this mapping of the legal landscape is badly incomplete?
What if we discover previously unknown features of this land, and some
Meriwether Lewis or William Clark brings back a report that convinces
us all to redraw the maps of prosecutor charging decisions? And what if
this new legal territory looks like New Jersey?
This paper describes some distinctive legal doctrines that the New
Jersey courts and legislature created over the last two decades to promote
more uniform and accountable decisions from prosecutors in the state.
Three features of these doctrines make them worth considering as a
model elsewhere, as a way to scrutinize and regularize prosecutorial
discretion all across the United States.
First, these prosecutor accountability doctrines were targeted to the
charging decisions with the most direct effects on the traditional judicial
functions in sentencing. New Jersey courts identified certain statutes that
created a tight connection between the prosecutor's charging decision
and the sentencing outcome (such as the use of mandatory minimum
sentences). The courts interpreted this subset of criminal laws to require
the attorney general to draft statewide charging guidelines to promote
more uniform prosecutorial choices throughout the state.
Second, the doctrines promoted more transparency in prosecutorial
decisions as the key strategy to more consistent and less arbitrary
charging. Courts required New Jersey prosecutors in particular cases
under these specialized statutes to submit a written explanation of how
the prosecutor planned to apply the charging guidelines in the case at
hand.
Third, the courts pushed the prosecutors to defend their charging
policies periodically, both in particular cases and at the systemic level.
The appellate courts read these statutes to empower the trial court to
review the prosecutor's statement of reasons. This deferential review
ensures that the charge and sentence in a particular case do not conflict
with the charging policy and are not arbitrary. Moving to the system
level, the New Jersey appellate courts periodically declared that existing
prosecutorial guidelines were not sufficiently specific to create
meaningfully uniform decisions.
As a consequence, the courts

3. The phrase is drawn from Administrative Law, describing a class of
administrative actions that are not subject to judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
The courts interpret this standard of review narrowly, to preserve judicial involvement in
a wide range of administrative decisions.
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repeatedly called for improved guidelines that would match the changing
priorities of criminal enforcement in the state.
This innovative doctrine could reorient our thinking about what is
possible and desirable for the control of prosecutorial discretion. The
judge-centered strategy of constitutional litigation to develop rules of
criminal procedure, a strategy that transformed the practices of police
departments during the middle of the twentieth century, is not a
promising model for controlling the prosecutor.4
Likewise, the
legislative controls that reshaped judicial sentencing discretion in many
states are not going to reach the comparable discretionary power of the
prosecutor.5 Instead, a recent school of legal scholarship has begun to
explore an "internal" alternative, tracking the impact of prosecutorial
office structures and policies on the consistency and accessibility of
charging and dispositions.6
Developments in New Jersey could contribute to this line of inquiry
by showing how judicial opinions and legislation can promote more and
better internal prosecutorial regulation.7 The legal doctrines developed
in New Jersey also suggest that judges can enforce prosecutorial
standards to make case processing more open and consistent, without
violating separation of powers in theory or in fact. 8 Even if judges and
4. See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Questfor Penal Justice: The Warren Court
and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519; Corinna Barrett Lain,
CountermajoritarianHero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court'sRole in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1361 (2004); Ronald F. Wright, How the
Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to State CriminalJustice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1429 (2002).
5. See David Boemer, The Role of the Legislature in Guideline Sentencing in "The
Other Washington, "28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 381 (1993). Although the legislative role
for prosecutorial discretion will not prove as profound as it has been for sentencing, there
are some promising parallels.
For a related proposal, see Michael L. Seigel &
Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: The Use (and Abuse?) of Federal
ProsecutorialPower, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1107 (2005) (proposing a "common law of
counts" modeled on U.S.S.G. Chapter 3D).
6. Recent examples include Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargainingoutside the Shadow
of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463 (2004) (calling for increased supervisory authority over
line prosecutors to counter irrational processing of information in plea bargaining);
Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REv. 323 (2004);
Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "DiscretionaryJustice,"
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167 (2004); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al
Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution,
COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/BargainingTradeoff,55 STAN. L. REv. 29 (2002).
7. The fruit of this long process in New Jersey, the Brimage Guidelines, have not
yet attracted academic attention beyond a note summarizing the holding and reasoning of
one key case in the line. See Brian J. Waters, Survey of Recent Developments in New
Jersey Law, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 1429 (1998).
8. This is an objective more generally of administrative law. For a discussion of
how the New Jersey "administrative law" experience might compare to other strategies
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legislators cannot themselves set standards for prosecutors to follow,
they can nudge the prosecutors toward meaningful self-regulation, and
keep that pressure in place over time.
Part II of this essay traces the interesting case law and legislation in
New Jersey that appears to promote prosecutor deliberation about how to
charge certain offenses. Part III asks what litigation realities we must
uncover before it is safe to conclude that the cases and statutes are
having any meaningful impact. Part IV notes how this New Jersey
experience changes the way we ordinarily evaluate the prospects for
regulating prosecutorial discretion, making it harder to claim that
prosecutorial discretion is not compatible with any generalized rules.
Part IV also points the way to a modest but meaningful judicial role in
reviewing some key prosecutorial charging decisions. The Conclusion
reflects on whether rules for prosecutors are generally desirable in the
context of American criminal justice today. Rules promote both
consistency and visibility of prosecutorial decisions, and it is worth
asking whether these qualities will lead to further severity in a system
that is already plenty severe.
II.

New Jersey Prosecutors and The Boss

Judges in New Jersey did not set out to regulate prosecutors; they
hoped only to maintain some meaningful role in sentencing, and
discovered along the way that the best defense is a good offense. As
New Jersey statutes cut back on traditional sentencing discretion for
judges, the efforts of judges to remain involved in sentencing led
inevitably back to charging, and involvement in charging inevitably
brought judges to the prosecutor's door.
As in other states, the New Jersey judiciary traditionally played the
central role in imposing sentences on convicted defendants. As an
extension of that sentencing authority, the courts in the early 1970s
helped create a pretrial intervention program (PT!). The court rule
establishing these programs 9 gave trial judges the authority to suspend
prosecutions against eligible defendants. The judge would then assign
the defendant to complete a rehabilitative program, lasting up to three
months. After the defendant successfully completed the program the
court would order dismissal of the charges. The PTI rules gave both the
prosecutor and the trial judge the power to block the defendant's request
for responding to prosecutorial discretion, see Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization,
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155

(2005).
9. N.J.R. Crim. Prac. 3:28 (comment at 457-458); Note, Criminal Practice-Pretrial
Intervention Programs-An Innovative Reform of the Criminal Justice System, 28

RUTGERS L. REV. 1203, 1208 n.34 (1975).
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to enter the program. Although the drafters of the court rule envisioned
that defendants charged with any crime could be eligible for a PTI
program, they also empowered local prosecutors to create further
eligibility rules. 10
In State v. Leonardis," the Bergen County Prosecutor denied
admission to the PTI program to a defendant who was charged with
possession with intent to sell marijuana. A county policy stated that
defendants charged with sale of a controlled dangerous substance would
"ordinarily" be excluded for the PTI program, and the program director
for the county denied the application on that basis, without gathering
further background information.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion favored looser standards
over stricter rules to guide the admissions decision. 12 The court held that
the county-level policy excluding defendants charged with drug
trafficking was inconsistent with the statewide court rule governing
admissions to the program. The policy was inconsistent because the
court rule embodied a "liberal" rehabilitative admission policy, and any
"exclusionary criteria" at the county level should be "guidelines only and
not... mandatory standards.' 13 The court resolved the state-versus-local
conflict in favor of more centralized control, declaring that "statewide
PTI programs should be implemented according to uniform guidelines,"
in the form of revisions to Court Rule 3.28.14 The rules that the court
created soon after the release of the Leonardis opinion set out some
relevant considerations, such as a defendant's "amenability to correction,
responsiveness to rehabilitation and nature of the offense," but insisted
15
that defendants "accused of any crime shall be eligible for admission."
The Leonardis case also set two other important precedents. It
declared the power of courts to admit a defendant to a PTI program
without the prosecutor's consent, if the prosecutor was acting contrary to
law in refusing to recommend the defendant. This power was not
explicitly stated in the rule. The court also held (again, drawing an
inference from the unclear language of the rule) that prosecutors had to
state on the record their reasons for denying any defendant's application
10. The rule required the Assignment Judge to make the determination of entry to
the program for defendants charged with specified serious crimes. N.J.R. Crim. Prac.
Rule 33.28(a).
11. 363 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1976) (Leonardis I).
12. On the distinction between rules and standards, see generally Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 591 (1992); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 61-69 (1992).
13. Leonardis, 363 A.2d at 335.
14. Id. at 340.
15. Id. (emphasis in original).

1092

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

to a PTI program, as 16 a way to facilitate the court's review and
enforcement of its rules.
The state attorney general filed a petition for clarification, and the
Supreme Court clarified with a vengeance. In Leonardis I, 1 7 the court
reaffirmed its earlier decision and explored the separation of powers
implications of the ruling. The judicial requirement that prosecutors

submit a statement of reasons, together with judicial power to review the
legality of a prosecutor's refusal to grant a defendant entry to a PTI
program, were both consistent with the state's constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. According to the court, an inherent part of judicial
power was "the judiciary's authority to fashion remedies," a proposition
connected to the traditional view that "sentencing is a judicial
function."'' 8 Because the decision to suspend prosecution of a case and

admit a defendant to a PTI program is a "quasi-judicial decision," any
separation of powers problem dissolved.
The court also invoked traditional administrative law practice. Even
if the prosecutor's decision were viewed as purely executive, judges are
"commonly called upon to review the rationality of decisions by other
branches of government or agencies with special expertise."' 19 Finally,
the court drew from the administrative law context to set the scope of
review. A defendant must establish that the prosecutor's denial of
admission was arbitrary and capricious,2 ° a familiar standard for courts
reviewing the determinations of administrative agencies. 2'
The Leonardis principles stayed close to home in the PTI context

16. Id at 336 (the Court's "power to enforce court rules ... necessarily includes the
power to review decisions made pursuant to those rules. In order to facilitate such
review, courts require a record setting forth reasons for the decision which is to be
reviewed.").
17. State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (N.J. 1977).
18. Id. at 612, n.5.
19. Id. at 615. The court's examples included judicial review of Civil Service
Commission and Parole Board decisions. See Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Board,
277 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1971) (ruling that the parole board must provide statement of reasons
to inmates denied parole). The court was also quick to distinguish this control over
prosecutor access to the PTI programs from any meddling with the prosecutor's charging
power, because PTI programs use the power of the court to compel a defendant to submit
to a correctional program. Leonardis, 375 A.2d at 617; see also People v. Super. Court
of San Mateo, 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974); Sledge v. Super. Ct. of San Diego, 520 P.2d 412
(Cal. 1974).
20. Leonardis, 375 A.2d at 618. Guideline 8, issued by the Supreme Court during
the period between Leonardis I and Leonardis II, invoked the arbitrary and capricious
standard. The Court in Leonardis II emphasized the deferential nature of this standard: a
defendant must "clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's refusal to
sanction admission into the program was based on a patent and gross abuse of his
discretion." 375 A.2d at 618.
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2004).
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for 15 years,22 but in 1992 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended those
early attempts to guide prosecutor decisions. In State v. Lagares23 and
State v. Vasquez, 24 the court interpreted two statutes that gave the
prosecutor control over mandatory increases in sentences for drug
crimes. One of those statutes provided that after a conviction for a
narcotics crime, a defendant with a prior record of narcotics offenses
"shall upon application of the prosecuting attorney be sentenced by the
court to an extended term" of imprisonment. 25 The court held that the

legislature's preference for uniform sentences in drug cases, together
with the state's separation of powers doctrine, required prosecutors to
follow general guidelines to assure uniform decisions when exercising
this exceptional "delegated" sentencing power.26
While the court in Leonardis assigned itself drafting duties to create
the guidelines for prosecutors to follow, the Lagares court instead
delegated the drafting of guidelines to the state attorney general:
"Because we are not familiar with all of the factors that law-enforcement
agencies might consider significant in determining whether a defendant
should be exempted from an extended sentence, we request that the
Attorney General, in consultation with the various county prosecutors,
adopt guidelines for use throughout the state. 27
The court also carried forward the Leonardis requirement that
prosecutors state reasons in particular cases for a refusal to waive the
sentence enhancement.
Equally important, the court insisted that
22. But see State v. Warren, 558 A.2d 1312 (N.J. 1989) (prohibiting the use of plea
agreements that result in a "negotiated sentence," because it encroaches on the judicial
responsibility in sentencing).
23. 601 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1992).
24. 609 A.2d 29 (N.J. 1992); see also State v. Gonzalez, 603 A.2d 516 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1992) (interpreting school zone enhancement statute to allow judicial
review of prosecutorial discretion, anticipating Vasquez).
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6f(West 2004); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-12
(West 2004) (providing that in the case of any person guilty of possessing drugs with
intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school, the court upon conviction "shall impose"
the mandatory sentence "unless the defendant has pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated
agreement... which provides for a lesser sentence").
26. Vasquez, 609 A.2d at 37. Note that the court evolved from calling prosecutor
guidelines constitutionally tolerable in Leonardis to calling them constitutionally required
in Lagares and Vasquez.
27. State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698, 704 (N.J. 1992). The court's suggestion that
prosecutors create their own internal guidelines was already a feature of capital
jurisprudence in New Jersey. The court suggested in dicta in State v. Koedatich, 548
A.2d 939, 955 (N.J. 1988), that the Attorney General and County Prosecutors consult
with Public Defenders and create guidelines for charging decisions in capital cases. The
Attorney General did issue such guidelines, and the courts proved willing to enforce the
guidelines in individual cases. See State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1992) (directing
prosecutor on remand to determine charging decision in accordance with Attorney
General's death penalty guidelines).
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separation of powers principles, and the traditional judicial role in
sentencing,
preserved a place for judicial review of the prosecutor's
28
decision.
The opinions in Lagares and Vasquez changed the Leonardis
principles in important ways. First, they extended the trio of consistency
requirements-guidelines, a statement of reasons from the prosecutor,
and judicial review-to a new setting. While Leonardis dealt with
prosecutor choices to block defendant entry to pre-trial programs, the
1992 cases addressed a point in the process closer to traditional plea
bargaining. 9 Second, the opinions in the 1992 cases deferred more
carefully to prosecutorial decisions regarding plea bargaining by asking
the attorney general to generate internal guidance rather than imposing
guidelines drafted by judges. By the same token, the Lagares and
Vasquez cases described a somewhat more vigorous standard of review
for the courts to use when checking on the prosecutor's reasoning.3 °
After this expansion of the consistency trio in 1992, New Jersey
prosecutors responded by drafting statewide guidelines for sentence
extensions in drug cases. 31 The courts quickly signaled a willingness to
enforce those requirements; they remanded cases when prosecutors failed
to file a statement of reasons.32 For instance, when prosecutors in
particular cases declared that defendants who failed to appear at trial
proceedings would receive no prosecutorial waiver of the sentence
extension, the courts noted that this "failure to appear" factor did not
appear in the statewide guidelines: "If prosecutors intend to employ the
28.
29.

Lagares, 601 A.2d at 704-05.
Both of the statutes in these cases gave prosecutors two points of control: the

decision to file the charge that makes the defendant eligible for an extended sentence, and
the invocation of the extended sentence itself. The statute also makes the plea agreement
regarding any reduced amount of an enhanced sentence binding on the court. Cf State v.
Oliver, 689 A.2d 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (distinguishing Lagares and
Vasquez from filing of qualifying third "strike" felony under Three Strikes and You're In
statute).
30. Unlike the Leonardis court, the opinions in Lagares and Vasquez did not
emphasize the deferential nature of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
31. See DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO
APPLY FOR AN EXTENDED TERM PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f (N.J. Att'y Gen. April
20, 1992); DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES GOVERNING PLEA-BARGAINING AND
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS IN DRUG PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING MANDATORY TERMS (N.J.

Att'y Gen. Sept. 15, 1992). Note that the court decided Lagares on February 6 and the
Attorney General issued responsive guidelines by April 20; the Vasquez case appeared on
July 22 and the responsive guidelines took effect on September 15.
32.

See State v. Maldonado, 715 A.2d 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (no

explanation for denial of entry to PTI, remanded for statement of reasons); State v. Perez,
701 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (remanded because prosecutor did not file
statement of reasons); State v. Press, 651 A.2d 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(mandatory minimum punishment for drugs within school zone, remanded because
prosecutor did not explain refusal to waive).
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factor in the decision-making process, the factor will have to be
incorporated in the guidelines. 3 3 Further, the courts insisted that the
statewide rules avoid automatic exclusions, and instead employ looser
standards to guide the prosecutor's decision.34 When prosecutors
properly relied on guideline factors and explained their relevance in
particular cases, however, courts readily affirmed their decisions on the
mandatory sentence extensions.35
The New Jersey Supreme Court ratcheted up its expectations for
prosecutor guidelines a few years later when it insisted that the state
attorney general, rather than the Prosecuting Attorneys for each county,
keep effective control of the charging guidelines. In State v. Gerns,36 the
court was asked whether a defendant fulfilled his obligations under a
plea agreement calling for "cooperation" in an investigation by giving his
best efforts in an unfruitful investigation. The court noted that various
counties had different guidelines on this question, because the statewide
guidelines encouraged county prosecutors to create their own guidelines,
using the statewide version as a model. The court flagged these county
variations as a threat to the uniformity required under the statutory
scheme and the constitutional separation of powers. Rather than
ordering changes to the county guidelines, the court asked the attorney
general to review sentencing practices in the state and to report back to
the court.37

33. State v. Shaw, 618 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1993). The Attorney General issued
revised guidelines promptly.
See REVISIONS TO "GUIDELINES GOVERNING PLEABARGAINING

AND

DISCRETIONARY

DECISIONS

IN

DRUG

PROSECUTIONS

INVOLVING

MANDATORY TERMS" (N.J. Att'y Gen. April 6, 1993).
34. Shaw, 618 A.2d at 301 ("Not every violation of the waiver conditions by an
accused defendant will result in automatic imposition of a mandatory sentence. The
automatic imposition of enhanced punishment for a non-appearance without holding a
hearing or considering an explanation would be unwarranted."); see also State v.
Jimenez, 630 A.2d 348, 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (upholding prosecutor
guidelines calling for sentence extensions in absence of cooperation by defendant in
normal cases, but "there may be situations in which a prosecutor's rigid insistence upon
the defendant's assistance in ferreting out crime might so offend the interests of justice as
to compel judicial intervention").
35. See State v. Kirk, 678 A.2d 233 (N.J. 1996) (holding that state sufficiently
explained its reasoning on the record and cited ample evidence demonstrating an
escalating pattern of drug activity); State v. Gems, 678 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996) (holding
prosecutor may base a recommendation to waive mandatory sentence on the degree of
compliance by the defendant with terms of plea agreement).
36. 678 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996).
37. Id. ("The issue of sentence disparity is most appropriately addressed on a
comprehensive basis rather than considered and resolved in the narrow context and under
the procedural constraints of an adversarial proceeding. Accordingly, we request the
Attorney General to undertake a review of the state-wide sentencing practices and
experience under the Attorney General Guidelines and to furnish the Court with the
results of that review as well as any forthcoming recommendations.").
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The second shoe dropped almost two years later in State v.
Brimage.38 The newly-revised guidelines no longer authorized county
prosecutors to create their own guidelines using the state guidelines
merely as a model. Instead, the new state guidelines set out a "base
minimum plea offer" that prosecutors were allowed to make for various
crimes, and authorized the county prosecutors to modify those guidelines
by moving up from that base. That is, county guidelines could increase
the lowest sentence that a prosecutor could offer in exchange for a guilty
plea. Despite the changes to the guidelines, the defendant in Brimage
objected that the Somerset County guidelines allowed prosecutors to
offer a less favorable plea deal than he might have received in other
counties. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the revised drug
charging guidelines still left too much room for variation from county to
county.
As in prior cases, the court in Brimage emphasized that the
prosecutor here was effectively making a sentencing decision. The
prosecutor's motion to request a mandatory sentence enhancement after
conviction for the relevant drug crime was binding on the sentencing
judge. Thus, both separation of powers principles and the legislative
policy favoring uniform sentences in drug cases-both reasons already
it necessary for prosecutors to
explored in Lagares and Vasquez-made
39
follow uniform statewide guidelines.
The Brimage court also added a new reason to support this
outcome: any legal restrictions on the discretion of sentencing judges
should apply equally to prosecutors. New Jersey sentencing statutes in
many different areas were moving toward less discretionary sentencing.
Because the law provided narrower permissible ranges and specific
aggravating and mitigating factors forjudges to consider at sentencing, it
was also necessary to constrain the sentencing discretion of
prosecutors. 4 0 Legal restrictions on the power of judges and prosecutors
to individualize sentences need not be identical, but they should be
roughly symmetrical.
According to the Brimage court, the new statewide guidelines could
account for different prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional resources
available in each county. Nevertheless, any "flexibility on the basis of
resources or local differences must be provided for and explicitly

38.
39.

706 A.2d 1096 (N.J. 1998).
Id. at 1104-06; see also State v. Rolex, 747 A.2d 311, 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

Div. 2000) (finding that guideline allowing county prosecutors to determine whether to
grant sentence benefit for defendants who fail to appear is overly vague; "the parties,
including the Attorney General, should address the question whether it is feasible to
devise more specific guidelines").
40. Brimage, 706 A.2d at 1106.
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detailed within uniform, statewide guidelines., 41 The attorney general
issued new guidelines soon after the court's decision, now known as
"Brimage guidelines," and reined in the available plea offers and limited
the factors considered during plea negotiations across the state.4 2
The New Jersey Supreme Court continues to reinforce and extend
its trio of consistency devices: internal prosecutor guidelines, statements
of reasons from individual prosecutors, and deferential review by courts
for compliance with the guidelines. The court has extended this regime
to certain collateral sanctions that turn on a prosecutorial
recommendation.4 3 It has hinted that permissive joinder practices by
prosecutors might ultimately require some uniform guidelines, because
sentences under the state's "Three Strikes" law depend so heavily on the
number of previous separate convictions.4 4 A concurring justice has
even suggested that prosecutorial charging and declinations more
generally should now become subject to statewide attorney general
guidelines to promote consistency across a broader range of cases.4 5
This consistency strategy also finds favor outside the judiciary, as
both the attorney general and the state legislature have used these
techniques even when the state courts did not directly order them to do
so. The New Jersey Attorney General created statewide prosecutor
46
guidelines to regularize decisions about various collateral sanctions.
41. Id. at 1107.
42. See The Brimage Revisions, N.J.L.J. Oct. 11, 2004, at 22.
43. See Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 561, 796 A.2d 182 (N.J. 2002) (extending
Lagares to statute allowing prosecutor to waive job forfeiture sanction for public
employee who is convicted of a crime; court suggests 16 factors for Attorney General to
consider in drafting guidelines).
44. State v. Livingston, 797 A.2d 153, 163 (N.J. 2002) ("We are unaware of any
abuse occurring based on our permissive joinder practice. Should guidelines become
necessary, we will consider asking the Attorney General to draft guidelines to aid
prosecutors in the use of their discretion as we have in the past.").
45. State v. D.A.V., 823 A.2d 34, 36-37 (N.J. 2003) (Albin, J., concurring) (urging
Attorney General to promulgate guidelines to assist prosecutors in choosing whether to
prosecute under one or the other statute in case involving prosecutor's decision to charge
defendant with second degree endangering the welfare of a child rather than fourth
degree abuse or neglect of children).
46. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 378-79 (N.J. 1995) (holding constitutional
Attorney General's Guidelines for implementation of convicted sex offender registration
and notification statutes); In re Carroll, 772 A.2d 45, 51-52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (upholding Attorney General Guidelines on removal of police officers who refuse
to cooperate in internal affairs investigations); Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 462
A.2d 573, 592 (N.J. 1993) (fact that Attorney General volunteered to create guidelines
under Drug Paraphernalia Act strengthens constitutionality of statute). Initially, the
courts held that statewide guidelines were not compelled in this context. See State v.
Lazarchick, 715 A.2d 365, 371-72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (employment
forfeiture; finding no judicial review under an abuse of discretion standard, and the
prosecutor acts alone). For a collection of Attorney General guidelines on various topics,
see http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
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The legislature also took the hint from the supreme court. When it
revised the state laws regarding juvenile delinquency in 2000, the new
legislation required the attorney general to create statewide guidelines to
improve the consistency of the prosecutor's selection between the adult
and juvenile systems. Of course, the appellate courts carried the
legislature's move a step further, and interpreted the statute to allow
judicial review of the prosecutor's decision in particular cases.4 7
Once the New Jersey Supreme Court started to characterize
prosecutorial decisions as components of sentencing in the 1970s, the
path to regulation became clear. The entire series of appellate cases
promoted statutory coherence by applying some of the uniformity
obligations that sentencing statutes imposed on judges to prosecutors.
By prompting the prosecutors to create guidelines and by enforcing their
use by individual prosecutors, the New Jersey courts forced a sharing of
power over criminal sentencing, along with a sharing of the burdens of
uniformity. The state legislature did nothing to reverse this new division
of authority, and even enacted similar prosecutor guideline provisions of
its own. The attorney general and the county prosecutors, by enacting
and using the guidelines, reinforced the rule of law and, as we will see in
Part III, proved that such internal guidance can have real effects.48
III.

Ground-Level Effects of Prosecutor Guidelines

The cases described above are remarkable appellate decisions,
offering a distinctive vision of the power of prosecutor guidelines and the
prospects for judicial review of prosecutorial choices. But does the New
Jersey case law bear any resemblance to the New Jersey reality? Here,
as in the rest of the world, there can be profound differences between the
world visible through the lens of appellate opinions and the world as it
exists at the courthouse level.
My conclusions must remain tentative for now, but there are two

47.

In re R.C., 798 A.2d 111, 112-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that

Attorney General Guidelines required that a prosecutor's motion for waiver from juvenile

to adult court contain a statement of reasons and was subject to judicial review); see also
Charles Toutant,

Drunken-Driving Loophole Plugged, 176

N.J.L.J.

450

(2004)

(describing bill A-2259 that calls on attorney general to promulgate guidelines for
prosecution of drunken driving violations).
48.

For an exploration of the social benefits of transparent adherence to rule of law

values, see Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to

Law and Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 989 (2000) (noting that "the
key to the effectiveness of legal authorities lies in creating and maintaining the public
view that the authorities are functioning fairly"); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law
Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 363 (2001)
(reviewing survey data showing that the effectiveness of police "lies in their ability to
gain acceptance for their decisions among members of the public").
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basic reasons to believe that the appellate cases surveyed here created
real effects on the ground, for good and for ill. First, the content of the
guidelines includes some concrete features that ought to influence actual
practices. Second, the state's prosecutorial leadership has treated the
guidelines as if they have real consequences; they revise the guidelines
from time to time to effect policy changes.4 9
Consider first the type of content in these guidelines. Written
guidelines for line prosecutors are quite common, particularly in larger
offices where bureaucratic realities prevent the elected prosecutor from
monitoring all the work of the office closely. 50 The content of such
guidelines falls into several different categories. Some of the guidelines
contain procedural limitations, instructing the line prosecutor to obtain
approval from supervisors for certain charges, dismissals, or sentence
recommendations. Such guidelines may not place any substantive limits
on the outcomes available to the prosecutor, but they promote
deliberation and can reduce the idiosyncrasies of a single prosecutor.5 1
Guidelines may also give prosecutors loose substantive guidance,
by listing factors for the prosecutor to consider in a given case.5 2 Such
factor-list guidelines have weaker binding power, for the factors might
simply restate the obvious without instructing a prosecutor how to weight
the various factors. 53 Still, even a factor-list guideline can influence
practices if it creates a more uniform mental checklist for prosecutors to
then it
use in every case; if the list of factors purports to be exclusive,
54
list.
the
on
included
not
is
what
ask
to
interesting
most
becomes
The guidelines that the New Jersey Attorney General issued after
the judicial opinions canvassed in Part I include some elements of
procedural policies. In addition, some sections of the guidelines include
substantive limits that have more binding power than factor-list

49. See Judith A. Greene, New Jersey Sentencing and a Callfor Reform 11 (2003),
available at http://www.famm.org/pdfs/82750_NewJersey.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005)
(New Jersey defense attorneys "report that prosecutors generally follow the guidelines to
the letter, taking advantage of every opportunity to wield a mandatory minimum or an
extended prison term as a tool for plea bargaining in drug cases. Exceptions occur only
in a few high-volume jurisdictions-Essex and Hudson counties.").
50. See Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion
in Regulating Plea Bargaining,73 JUDICATURE 335, 339 (1990).
51. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES,
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 10 14-32 (2d ed. 2003).
52.

See NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION,

NATIONAL PROSECUTION

STANDARDS (2d ed. 1991).
53. Cf WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.450, 9.94A.460 (2005).
54. The presence or absence of some considerations marks one of the important
differences in Department of Justice policies between 1987 and the present. See NORA
DEMLEITNER, ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES

117-68 (2004).
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guidelines.
The Brimage Guidelines directly limit outcomes that
prosecutors can reach during plea negotiations. In effect, they place
price caps on the offers that a prosecutor can make.55
The Lagares and Vasquez guidelines from 1992 instructed
prosecutors as to what sentence outcomes they could offer in exchange
for a guilty plea. For instance, Section 11.3 of those guidelines stated that
prosecutors had to insist on a minimum of probation conditioned on 364
days in jail for a defendant convicted of a drug offense under Section
2C:35-7.56 The 1998 revisions to the guidelines, prompted by the
Brimage case, also made the crime of conviction the key factor in setting
a minimum plea offer available to prosecutors across the state.57 These
revised guidelines, however, instructed prosecutors to account for the
criminal history of the defendant and several specified aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.5 8
To a greater extent than process-based guidelines or factor-list
guidelines, price-cap guidelines are likely to affect practices in the
courthouse. It is possible that line prosecutors can avoid price-cap
guidelines through pre-charge negotiations or other techniques. 59 These
possibilities warrant more investigation than my preliminary inquiry here
55. Cf N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10 (McKinney); Colin Loftin, Milton
Heumann, & David McDowall, Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Violence:

Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 287 (1983) (evaluating
a ban on plea bargains for targeted firearms crimes).
56. See DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO
APPLY FOR AN EXTENDED TERM PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f (N.J. Att'y Gen. Sept.

15, 1992).
57. See State v. Fowlkes, 778 A.2d 422,426 (N.J. 2001).
58. Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12
(May 20, 1998) ), availableat http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agguid.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005). Defense attorneys in New Jersey especially dislike the rigidity of these
charging and sentencing rules. See Greene, supra note 49, at 10-14.
59. See Ahmed Taha, The Equilibrium Effect of Legal Rule Changes: Are the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Being Circumvented? 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 251

(2001). The guidelines bar charge bargains outright: "When a prosecutor has a factual
and legal basis to charge a defendant with a Brimage-eligible offense, the prosecutor shall
be required to charge the most serious provable Brimage-eligible offense, and the
prosecutor shall not dismiss, downgrade, or dispose of such charge except in accordance
with the provisions and requirements of these Guidelines." BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 § 3,

available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/Revised-Brimage-Guidelines.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2005).
Generally speaking, charge bargains should be the first target for internal regulation
because sentence bargains involve decisions where prosecutors must share authority with
legislatures and judges, while prosecutors operate more unilaterally when it comes to
charge bargains. See Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, Honesty and Opacity in
Charge Bargains,55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410-11 (2003). Nevertheless, the New Jersey
strategy of promoting self-regulation in the arena of sentence bargains makes sense
because the appellate cases target specialized statutes which give the prosecutor's
sentence recommendation binding effect, precisely where the power is not shared.
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will allow. But the category of content in the New Jersey guidelines
makes them more difficult for prosecutors to ignore or evade than would
be the case with process or factor-list guidelines.
The second clue showing that these guidelines are more than
window dressing is that the state Department of Law and Public Safety
leaders treat them as if they matter. These leaders change the policies
when they want to shift their emphasis or strategy in crime policy. For
instance, Governor Christie Todd Whitman ordered changes to the drug
charging guidelines in 1996 to make drug enforcement, particularly drug
sales near school property, a more urgent priority for law enforcement
officers and prosecutors. 60 Further amendments to the guidelines
appeared in 1999, 2000, and 2001.61
More recently, Attorney General Peter Harvey issued revised
Harvey was convinced, after an informal
Brimage Guidelines.
judge, to reconsider drug enforcement in the
a
trial
conversation with
state and he began consultations with the state's prosecutors, defense
policy review was a
attorneys, judges, and others. The end result of this 62
lengthy (104-page) revised version of the guidelines.
The basic thrust of the revised guidelines was to make them depend
less on the crime of conviction and to account for more specific offense
characteristics, such as the amount of drugs and the presence of a
weapon, and offender characteristics such as prior criminal record or
The revised drug charging guidelines were
gang membership.63
explicitly modeled on sentencing guidelines, allowing points for
60. See Peter Verniero, Attorney General's Supplemental Directivefor Prosecuting
Cases Under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (Jan. 6, 1997), available at

http://www.unioncountynj.org/Prosecutor/brimage2.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005);
State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096, 1103 (N.J. 1998).
61. May 1999 Revisions to Attorney General Directive 1998-1, available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agdirctl .pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); Supplemental
Directive Revising the Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under
N.J.S.A.

2C:35-12

(Sept.

1999),

available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/

unfguid2.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); Application Notes to Attorney General
Directive 1998-1 and Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases Under N.J.S.A.
2C:35-12 (May 15, 2000), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/unfguid.pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2005); John J. Farmer, Jr., Memo to Prosecutors, No Appearance/No
Waiver

Plea

Agreements

(June

11,

2001),

available at http://www.state.nj.us/

lps/dcj/agguide/rolex.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
62. See Mary P. Gallagher, Judges, Prosecutors Given More Flexibility in Drug
Plea-Bargains, 177 N.J.L.J. 290, (2004); Right Path on Drug Laws, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), Oct. 6, 2004; Jonathan Schuppe, State Offers New Rules in Drug Dealer Plea
Deals, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), July 21, 2004, at 27; Robert G. Seidenstein, Drug Plea
Revamp Cuts Minorities a Big Break, 13 N.J. LAWYER 30 (2004); The Brimage
Revisions, 178 N.J.L.J. 242 (2004).
63. BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 § 3 (effective Sept. 15, 2004), available at

http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/RevisedBrimage-Guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2005).
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aggravating and mitigating factors, and authorizing prosecutors to grant
"downward departures" from the guidelines in cases where a defendant
offers substantial assistance in the investigation or in cases where the
government must depend on weak evidence.64 The revisions reduced the
value of "authorized plea offers" available in cases involving defendants
associated with gangs and those who carry weapons, while at the same
65
time they made more lenient offers possible for other drug defendants.
This re-scaling of plea practices was especially important for cases
involving drug sales in school zones, because an urban-suburban divide
was stark for these crimes. In most urban areas, virtually all drug sales
happened within 1000 feet of a school, contributing to a huge racial
imbalance in the prison populations.66
Many practicing attorneys and legal scholars conclude that
meaningful guidelines for prosecutors are impossible to draft.67
According to these scholars, the rules will either be phrased so generally
that they will change no prosecutor choices, or they will be phrased too
specifically and lead to improper outcomes in some cases because the
rules cannot anticipate the complex reality of criminal charging.
The New Jersey experience, however, makes this critique less
believable. Over time, prosecutors can draft guidelines on their own that
promote some reasonable uniformity in case processing, while allowing
64.

Id. §§ 12, 13.

65.
66.

Id. §§2,6, 10, 11.
See Gallagher, supra note 62; Schuppe, supra note 62; Seiderstein, supra note

62.
67. See ARTHUR I. ROSETT & DONALD
BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE

R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA
(1976) (argues for individualized justice,
futility of efforts at prosecutorial consistency); PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS:
DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURTS (1978) (consistency must give way
to individualized prosecutor decisions); Kenneth J. Melilli, ProsecutorialDiscretion in
an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 674-675 (only some aspects of
prosecution, such as type of offense charged, lend themselves to categories that can be
captured in rules); Lloyd E. Ohlin, Surveying Discretion by Criminal Justice Decision
Makers, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION
AND UNIFORMITY I (Lloyd Ohlin & Frank Remington eds., 1993) (complexity is a
fundamental attribute of the variety of problems in criminal justice; prosecutors must
respond with flexibility); LIEF H. CARTER, THE LIMITS OF ORDER (1974); Boerner, supra
note 5 (reviewing reasons that prosecutor guidelines should not be enforceable); Stanley
Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 197 (1988); Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, the Decision to
Convict on a Plea of Guilty, and the Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution
Practices, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN
INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 73 (Lloyd Ohlin & Frank Remington eds., 1993)
(we lack the knowledge necessary to decide how best to structure the charging decision
so that it focuses on how best to achieve the social control objectives of criminal justice);
but see David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor'sRole, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 509, 532 (1999) (discussing the inevitable application of general principles to
specific cases for prosecutors, even in absence of formalized guidelines).
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for the variety that criminal justice makes necessary. Indeed, there are
many parallels between this task and the maturing efforts to create
sentencing guidelines that strike a useful balance between uniformity and
individualization. 68 The familiar sentencing concept of a favored
"presumptive" outcome, coupled with potential "departures" from the
norm that are discouraged by some degree of review and possible
reversal, already exists in embryonic form in the Brimage guidelines for
prosecutors. 69 The successes and failures of sentencing guidelines over
the last two decades have marked the path for the prosecutorial
guidelines that might follow behind.
IV. Judges as Catalysts for Prosecutor Self-Regulation
The judgment that these guidelines can make a difference depends
in no small part on the judicial review feature. These New Jersey courts
not only required prosecutors to draft guidelines that could collect dust
(or viruses) while sitting unused on prosecutors' shelves (or hard drives).
The decisions also announced that prosecutors must routinely explain
their sentence "recommendations" with reference to the guidelines, and
that trial judges would review those choices in particular cases. This
judicial review creates some pressure for uniform application of the
guidelines; it also creates ongoing pressure for adaptation of the
guidelines in light of experience.
New Jersey courts made this review possible by turning the tables
on traditional separation of powers arguments.70 While it is routine for
courts to steer clear of prosecutor charging and plea bargaining practices
because of concern about interfering with a core executive function, the
opinions in New Jersey argued just the opposite. Because prosecutor
charging decisions, particularly in connection with mandatory minimum
sentencing, have sentencing implications, they encroach on judicial turf.
Principles of separation of powers actually compel judges to prompt the
creation of guidelines. Further, the statutes that impose obligations of
uniformity on sentencing judges dictate the level of regulation that
prosecutors must endure. More serious efforts by the legislature to force
more uniform judicial sentencing would get passed along to prosecutors
68. See Steven Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2005). Because the prosecutors themselves generate the guidelines perhaps
the best parallel would be a state like Delaware or Virginia, in which judges themselves
were integral to the creation of sentencing guidelines.
69. BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 §§ 9, 10, 12, 13 (2004), available at
http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/RevisedBrimage-Guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2005).
70. For another effort to reconcile limited judicial review of prosecutor charging
decisions with separation of powers principles, see Wayne A. Logan, A ProposedCheck
on the ChargingDiscretion of Wisconsin Prosecutors,1990 Wis. L. REv. 1695.
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as the courts shape the creation and enforcement of prosecutor
uniformity guidelines.
While the New Jersey doctrine does use a creative reversal of old
arguments, it also draws on familiar precedents to assure that judicial
monitoring will not become disabling or distorting for prosecutors. The
Brimage Guidelines embody a classic form of judicial review in
administrative law, which empowers the court to overturn an agency
action if it is "arbitrary and capricious."'" The judge insists that the
agency explain its reasoning at the time of the decision, finds some
assurance that the agency considered the major alternatives, and looks
for some reasonable connection between the facts that the agency
believes to exist and the policy chosen.72 Experience has allowed the
courts and various administrative agencies to form productive
partnerships as the agency takes the lead in setting policy, while the
courts enforce fidelity to law and a deliberative policy process.7 3 This
productive, if not always friendly, relationship might be taking shape in
New Jersey between prosecutors and judges on sentencing questions.
V.

Conclusion-Are Consistent Prosecutors a Good Thing?

I close this brief case study with a question about one of its
underlying assumptions.
Granted, New Jersey courts might have
succeeded to some degree in promoting more uniform application of
legal standards by prosecutors in making their plea bargain choices. But
is greater uniformity and accountability to law a desirable trait for
American prosecutors? The answer remains in doubt, because in the
United States today criminal defendants face extraordinarily severe
sentences. Perhaps the only way to remove some of the severity is to
allow prosecutors to operate quietly, dispensing mercy in a few cases,
even if it is done inconsistently. Under this view, it may be better to
have unequal justice for some than equal injustice for all.74
For now, however, I remain hopeful about the virtues of law and
transparency, even in the prosecutor's office-especially in the
prosecutor's office. The public routinely calls for disappointing and
71. In fact, the New Jersey courts have brought to life a venerable proposal of
Kenneth Culp Davis that courts invoke the "required rulemaking" doctrine to force
prosecutors and other criminal justice "administrators" to pass administrative rules to
regulate their own discretion.

See KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 57-59,

220-21 (1969).
72. See RiCHARD PIERCE, SIDNEY SHAPIRO, &
LAW AND PROCESS 368-382, 391-397 (4th ed. 2004).
73. Id. at 397-403.

PAUL VERKHUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE

74. Recall that New Jersey defense attorneys by and large opposed the application of
the 1998 guidelines because they resulted overall in more severe sentences for drug
defendants.
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destructive policies in criminal justice, policies that tempt the
professionals in the system to evade such unhappy outcomes, invisibly
and inconsistently.7 5 Yet voters are also capable of learning about the
full costs of abstract punishments when they apply not just to
hypothetical worst-case defendants,76 but to a full range of men and
women with families and lives, offenders whose sentences force the
government to fund an expensive corrections program for the entire
group. When prosecutors declare their plans openly and allow others to
watch those plans unfold in particular cases, the public can better judge
whether to change course. And if the public, despite full information
about prosecutorial practices and correctional costs, endorses cruel and
pointless policies, I will face a deeper dilemma about democracy.

75. See Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical
Analysis of Declining FederalDrug Sentences IncludingDatafrom the DistrictLevel, 87
IOWA L. REv. 477 (2002); Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion?
Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REv.

1043 (2001).
76. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000).

